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The survival of the Belgian state is an important matter—and not just to Belgium. If, in the 
physical and administrative heart of Europe, groups that have lived together peacefully for 
nearly two centuries decide that they must part, what does that say about the prospects for 
more fragile, more recently constructed democracies? Partition and secession are generally 
bad answers to serious ethnic conflict, answers that usually have an array of negative 
consequences (Horowitz 2003). For this among other reasons, the proposal of the Pavia 
Group is to be commended. It aims to break the deadlock in Belgian politics and provide 
politicians with incentives to speak for the country as a whole, rather than merely for 
members of their own group. Furthermore, it does this by a method intended to affect 
politicians: attempting to change the mix of votes on which they rely for their election. This is 
a very good first step. 
The Pavia Group is not alone in attempting to give politicians the kind of reason politicians 
understand for modifying their behavior in an accommodative direction. Nigeria and 
Indonesia have adopted territorial distribution requirements, in addition to a bare plurality 
or majority of the vote, to elect presidents who will, in order to achieve adequate territorial 
distribution of the vote, become pan-ethnic figures. An array of proposals to use the 
majoritarian features of the supplementary vote or the alternative vote to prevent the election 
of parochial candidates have been advanced and sometimes adopted in local and national 
elections around the world, from mayoral contests in England to parliamentary contests in 
Papua New Guinea to presidential contests in Sri Lanka. Some political scientists have found 
that two-round runoff systems can produce significant votes across group lines in 
Switzerland, (Stojanovi! 2006), while others have proposed pooling of constituencies to 
create the heterogeneity that might be conducive to cross-ethnic appeals in Africa (Bogaards 
2003). Electoral engineering to make politicians partially dependent on the votes of 
members of groups other than their own is, therefore, very much on the agenda of policy 
makers and scholars of divided societies. 
The Pavia Group proposal can be viewed as an instance of constituency pooling to secure 
heterogeneity. The plan is to create 15 seats, 10 percent of the total federal House of 
Representatives, in a new nationwide territorial constituency. Each voter will have two votes. 
In addition to choosing from one of the party lists presented for their regional electoral 
constituency, voters will also vote for a list of candidates running in the nationwide federal 
constituency. The 15 seats will be allocated in proportion to the overall Flemish and 
Walloon population: 9 to Dutch-speakers and 6 to French-speakers. Parties will essentially 
have the option to present homogeneous lists of 6 or 9 candidates or a mixed list of as many 
as 15.  
Because the numbers of Flemish and Walloon representatives from the federal constituency 
will be predetermined, there is no risk that, for example, a Flemish voter casting a vote that 
helps elect a Walloon candidate will be altering the ratio of Flemings and Walloons who are 
elected. The whole point of the plan is to free both candidates and voters of their inhibitions 
on making appeals and casting votes across group lines. As the authors say (Deschouwer and 
Van Parijs 2009: MS 14), “catching a vote from the other language group will not alter the 
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numerical parliamentary representation of the language group to which a candidate belongs.” 
Then they go on to add that the 15 ethnically preallocated federal seats “will increase 
considerably the incentive for parties and candidates to court the voters across the linguistic 
border” (ibid.).  
Is this likely to be true? It is, after all, one thing to relieve inhibitions and another to create 
incentives. In this case, the relieved inhibitions go only to apprehensions that voters who 
cross ethnic lines will affect adversely (for their own group) the ethnic proportions of 
members of the federal parliament. With that inhibition removed, what in the plan will cause 
parties to make cross-ethnic appeals or cause voters to respond favorably to such appeals if 
they are made? 
It is impossible to answer this question in advance, but certain inferences from the overall 
structure of Belgian electoral politics are possible. According to the plan, 90 percent of the 
seats in the federal house will continue to be elected from constituencies that are wholly 
intraregional. Parties, too, are not organized across regional lines, as they once were; they are 
wholly ethnically based. Intraethnic party competition in each region is robust. The timetable 
of elections means that parties are “into a nearly permanent state of electoral campaign” 
(ibid.: 10), which will certainly make ethnically-based parties risk averse. Against this 
background, what is the basis for interethnic moderation? Will the parties in the same 
ideological stream, such as Christian Democrats, or Socialists, or Greens, put up joint lists in 
the federal constituency? Will individual parties put up interethnic lists of fifteen candidates, 
as opposed to homogeneous lists of six or nine, in the federal constituency? 
The first reason to be skeptical of the plan is that the national federal constituency is not 
isolated from electoral politics in the rest of the Belgian system, which is dominated by 
regional ethnic dynamics. The proposed innovation affects only 10 percent of the total 
number of federal house seats, surely not enough to change the overall thrust of ethnic 
politics. A Flemish party can put up a national list of nine candidates and win seats on 
Flemish votes, just as a Walloon party can put up a list of six candidates and win seats on 
Walloon votes. Of course, there may be a temptation to win a larger number of seats if each 
such party adds, respectively, six Walloon or nine Flemish candidates to its list. But consider 
the position of such candidates when they appear on the list of a party identified as belonging 
to the opposite group. They may well be regarded as token candidates, not genuine 
representatives of the interests of their group; and, as such, they will be unlikely to attract 
many votes from their own group. 
It would seem more likely that Flemish and Walloon parties of the same ideological family 
might cooperate by producing a single joint list of 15 candidates, with candidates of both 
groups placed high enough on the list to give the two partners a good chance to elect a mixed 
slate of candidates. The total vote obtained by such a list would be the product of both 
Flemish and Walloon votes. Yet it would still be clear that the Flemish voters and Walloon 
voters had cast their ballots for that list because it was produced by the ethnic party of each 
group, respectively, and victorious candidates of each group would understand that they 
owed their election to the ballots cast by voters loyal to one of the parties, rather than to 
both. And if some parties did not cooperate in this way and put up mixed lists, they would be 
likely to enjoy a competitive advantage over those that did. 
Equally important will be the residual pull of the regional seats on the federal seats. As things 
now stand, there is no incentive for a party running candidates in Flanders to be especially 
solicitous of the interests of Walloons or Wallonia, and vice versa. Even in the mixed 
Brussels region, the parties all behave as ethnically-based parties. How can such parties, 
facing such overwhelming ethnic incentives that determine 90 percent of their electoral 
fortunes be expected to behave in a conciliatory fashion when it comes to the 10 percent of 
the seats in which they have a chance to pick up votes from groups not affiliated with their 
parties? They can scarcely make one set of commitments in regional elections and another in 
federal elections held simultaneously. 
From the voter’s point of view as well, the possibility of casting one ballot, the regional one, 
for a party affiliated with his or her group but casting a second ballot for a party not so 
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affiliated but which offers the possibility of electing some candidates from his or her group 
would seem to be far-fetched. The two votes are likely to be cast for the same party.5 
In the background to all of this is the nature of the electoral system. Not only are voters 
overwhelmingly voting in homogeneous constituencies, but they are voting by list-system 
proportional representation. Now list PR has certain virtues, to be sure, even in ethnic 
politics. For example, where there are ethnic groups with prominent subethnic divisions, 
whether ideological or ascriptive, PR may allow the proliferation of parties within groups and 
so prevent ethnic bifurcation. In some ways, that is a description of its historical function in 
Belgium, in which socioeconomic and religious cleavages, as well as ethnicity, are expressed 
in the party system. There is, however, one function list PR typically does not perform, and 
that is providing incentives to bridge ethnic divisions. List PR is known as a centrifugal 
system (Cox 1990), and it is more appropriate for assuring descriptive ethnic representation 
than for fostering interethnic accommodation. What the Pavia Group proposals do by 
providing a federal electoral constituency is simply to add 15 seats elected from a 
heterogeneous constituency, but it is difficult to see how this would modify the ethnic-voting 
incentives of either candidates or voters. 
The matter is made even more problematic by the open-list character of the PR system 
utilized. This might allow voters of one group to move candidates up or down based on their 
ethnic affinity, thus defeating the intentions of parties that put up mixed lists. There is at least 
some evidence of such voter behavior in other divided societies.6 
To achieve its objectives, it would seem that the electoral system for the federal list would 
need to be different. If, for example, lists could only be elected if they achieved some 
territorial distribution threshold that testified to their interregional appeal, that standard for 
election would surely induce intergroup moderation on the part of candidates in such 
contests, and it would likely be reciprocated by voters. But, even then, the total effect on the 
political system would be mitigated by the tendencies emanating from the 90 percent of seats 
in which candidates are elected as representatives of ethnic interests. And it would be a very 
tricky task for any party to operate simultaneously in two electoral arenas—regional and 
federal—with such different electoral incentives. 
The Pavia Group undoubtedly has the right idea—to put in place preelectoral incentives for 
intergroup cooperation. Now what it needs to do is to follow that idea to its logical 
conclusion and redesign the Belgian electoral system so that it produces more conciliatory 
results. 
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